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In the classical setting, public-key encryption requires randomness in order to be secure against a
forward search attack, whereby an adversary compares the encryption of a guess of the secret message
with that of the actual secret message. We show that this is also true in the information-theoretic
setting — where the public keys are quantum systems — by defining and giving an example of a
forward search attack for any deterministic quantum-public-key bit-encryption scheme. However,
unlike in the classical setting, we show that any such deterministic scheme can be used as a black
box to build a randomized bit-encryption scheme that is no longer susceptible to this attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum-public-key cryptography, where the public
keys are quantum-mechanical systems, was introduced
by Gottesman and Chuang in Ref. [1], which contains
an information-theoretically secure quantum digital sig-
nature scheme for signing classical messages. Other ex-
plorations within this information-theoretic framework
include a no-go theorem for signing arbitrary quan-
tum states [2], “lock and key” systems and distribution
of quantum public keys [3], identification schemes [4],
and — our focus in this paper — encryption schemes
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Roughly put, the purpose of an encryption scheme is to
facilitate the communication of some secret information
over an insecure channel, from a sender to a receiver, such
that an adversary, who has access to this channel, cannot
obtain anything close to a meaningful representation of
the secret information. This secret information is called
the plaintext, while the actual signal sent over the chan-
nel, which somehow encodes the plaintext, is called the
ciphertext. In the classical setting, public-key encryption
requires randomness in order to be secure against a for-
ward search attack, whereby an adversary compares the
ciphertext encoding a guess of the plaintext or — test-
plaintext — with the ciphertext she is trying to decrypt
(see Ref. [10] for more details in the classical setting). We
show that this is also true in our information-theoretic
setting (defined in Section II), by defining and giving an
example of a forward search attack for any determinis-
tic bit-encryption scheme that uses quantum public keys.
However, unlike in the classical setting, we show that any
such deterministic scheme can be used as a black box
to build a randomized bit-encryption scheme that is no
longer susceptible to this attack.
II. QUANTUM-PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION
The potential for information-theoretic security in the
quantum-public-key setting arises from the existence
of a quantum function, mapping classical private keys
(binary strings) to corresponding quantum public keys
(quantum-mechanical systems), that is impossible to in-
vert. More precisely, we have the following general setup.
All users of the cryptosystem agree on a classical descrip-
tion of a set
A(n) ≡ { |Ψx〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n} (1)
of log2(d)-qubit pure states (in general, d = d(n)) such
that, for any distinct x and x′ in {0, 1}n,
|〈Ψx′ |Ψx〉| < δ (2)
for some positive constant δ < 1. Any user can now
choose a uniformly random private key k ∈ {0, 1}n
and then generate and distribute (at most) T quantum-
mechanical systems in or — copies of — the state |Ψk〉;
each copy of |Ψk〉 constitutes one (quantum) public key.
We assume that each public key reaches its intended re-
cipient in an authenticated fashion. The bijective map
x 7→ (T copies of |Ψx〉) (3)
is a one-way (quantum) function in the sense that, for a
given x ∈ {0, 1}n, the deterministic preparation of a sys-
tem in the state |Ψx〉 is possible via the classical descrip-
tion of A(n), while the inversion of the map (with non-
negligible probability) is guaranteed impossible by the
Holevo bound [11] when
n≫ T log2(d). (4)
This inequality thus sets an upper bound on the number
T of public keys that can be publicly distributed, in order
to ensure the secrecy of the private key, which is the mini-
mal requirement for security of any cryptographic scheme
2in this framework. Note that the notion of computational
efficiency may be ignored in an information-theoretic set-
ting; however, there do exist constructions of A(n) such
that n is large enough that the set is cryptographically
useful and such that, for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, a copy of |Ψx〉
can be computed in (quantum-) polynomial time from
input x [1, 12].
Within the above framework, a deterministic
quantum-public-key bit-encryption scheme may be
defined by further specifying (and publishing, along
with the description of A(n)) two unitary encryption
operators, Uˆ0 and Uˆ1, and a decryption procedure
whose exact form does not concern us. If Bob wants to
communicate the plaintext b ∈ {0, 1} to Alice, he obtains
an authenticated copy of Alice’s public key, which is,
by definition, in the state |Ψk〉, creates the (quantum)
ciphertext in the state |Φk,b〉 ≡ Uˆb |Ψk〉, and sends it
to Alice, who then decrypts and recovers the plaintext.
Note that Uˆ0 and Uˆ1 do not depend on the private key
k, but Alice’s decryption procedure does.
Of course, in general, in our quantum setting, the
plaintext can also be quantum, i.e., it can be a quantum-
mechanical system in a particular state. Thus, we are
focussing on the case where (a classical description of)
the set of all possible (quantum) plaintexts consists of
just two orthogonal states, |0〉 and |1〉. This is in fact the
most general case from a security point of view: it may be
seen as corresponding to the case where the adversary has
narrowed down the plaintext to one of two maximally-
distinguishable possibilities (of course, the states of the
corresponding ciphertexts need not be orthogonal, de-
pending on the encryption scheme; but, in any reason-
able scheme, orthogonal plaintext-states would give rise
to maximally-distinguishable ciphertexts, for a given key-
value). However, we do not formally define what it means
for an encryption scheme to be secure, because we do not
prove security of any scheme; we only ever refer to secu-
rity against a particular attack, i.e., our forward search
attack.
In the following, we may abuse terminology by refer-
ring to quantum public keys or ciphertexts by their clas-
sical descriptions, i.e., by their states.
III. FORWARD SEARCH ATTACK BASED ON
A SYMMETRY TEST
Before defining “(quantum) forward search attack”, we
should remind ourselves of what is the most general at-
tack for uncovering the plaintext encoded by a particular
ciphertext (as opposed to an attack that tries to compute
the private key). If an adversary, Eve, wants to decide
what the plaintext b is, given the ciphertext |Φk,b〉 and
all (T−1) possible copies of the public key |Ψk〉, then she
is ultimately faced with the problem of deciding which of
the following two states she has:
ρ0 ≡ 1
2n
∑
x
|Ψx〉〈Ψx|⊗(T−1)|Φx,0〉〈Φx,0| (5)
ρ1 ≡ 1
2n
∑
x
|Ψx〉〈Ψx|⊗(T−1)|Φx,1〉〈Φx,1|. (6)
The optimal procedure (“POVM”) for solving this “bi-
nary quantum decision problem” is given in Refs. [13, 14]
and depends on ρ0, ρ1, and the prior probability distri-
bution (p, 1 − p) of the plaintext b (i.e. P [b = 0] = p).
We assume that Eve can implement this optimal proce-
dure, since we do not place any computational resource-
bounds on her. The probability of success of this optimal
procedure, which is affinely related to the trace distance
between pρ0 and (1 − p)ρ1, is in general difficult to cal-
culate.
In this paper, we concentrate on a restricted class of
attacks that attempt to uncover the plaintext encoded
by a particular ciphertext.
Definition 1 (Forward search attack). A forward
search attack on a deterministic quantum-public-key bit-
encryption scheme is any (quantum) algorithm — inde-
pendent of the encryption and decryption operations and
the structure of the set of public keys — that outputs the
plaintext with some probability of error, given one copy
of the actual ciphertext and all available copies of the
ciphertext encoding a test-plaintext.
As an aside, we note that this definition sub-
sumes the definition of “forward search attack”
for computationally-secure, classical public-key bit-
encryption schemes that are implemented quantum-
mechanically [15]. In the following, we give a simple for-
ward search attack that we suspect is near to the optimal
forward search attack and whose probability of success
is easily computed. To simplify our presentation, we as-
sume that each plaintext is equally likely and thus always
use the test-plaintext 0 without loss of generality.
Following Ref. [12], we first define a problem that cap-
tures the essence of Eve’s task of determining the plain-
text via forward search attack (i.e. ignoring all structure
of the particular cryptosystem), and then we give a solu-
tion for it, based on a test for symmetry.
Definition 2 ((1, N − 1)-copy state distinguishing prob-
lem). Given one copy of |ξ〉 ∈ Cd and (N − 1) copies of
|χ〉 ∈ Cd such that either |ξ〉 = |χ〉 or |〈ξ|χ〉| = λ < 1,
decide which case holds.
To solve this problem with some probability of error, we
can use the symmetry-test procedure depicted in Fig. 1,
which we now explain. Let SN be the set of all N ! per-
mutations on N objects and let σ ∈ SN . The operator Fˆ
is the (N !)-dimensional quantum Fourier transform [12],
so that, in particular,
Fˆ |0〉 = 1√
N !
∑
σ∈SN
|σ〉, (7)
3|ξ〉|χ〉⊗(N−1)
|0〉 measureFˆ †Fˆ
σ
FIG. 1: (Color online) Symmetry-test for the (1, N − 1)-copy
state distinguishing problem. The top (blue) wire is a N !-
dimensional quantum system, whose state-space is spanned
by the computational basis states, each of which is labeled by
a permutation σ ∈ SN (e.g. |0〉 corresponds to the identity
permutation). The bottom wire represents N registers, each
of dimension d.
and the controlled-σ operator permutes the N target reg-
isters according to the permutation σ encoded by the
computational-basis-state of the control register. The
probability of the final measurement in the computa-
tional basis of the top register resulting in outcome “0”
is 1 when |ξ〉 = |χ〉. But when 〈ξ|χ〉 = λ < 1, this
probability is
∥∥∥∥∥(|0〉〈0| ⊗ I)
1√
N !
∑
σ∈SN
Fˆ† |σ〉σ( |ξ〉 |χ〉⊗(N−1))
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(8a)
=
∥∥∥∥∥
1√
N !
∑
σ∈SN
〈0| Fˆ† |σ〉σ( |ξ〉 |χ〉⊗(N−1))
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥
1
N !
∑
σ∈SN
σ( |ξ〉 |χ〉⊗(N−1))
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
N !2
∑
σ,τ∈SN
τ(〈ξ| 〈χ|N−1)σ( |ξ〉 |χ〉N−1)
=
1
N !2
∑
σ,τ∈SN
〈ξ| 〈χ|N−1τ−1σ( |ξ〉 |χ〉N−1)
=
1
N !
∑
σ∈SN
〈ξ| 〈χ|N−1σ( |ξ〉 |χ〉N−1)
=
(N − 1)!(1!)
N !
((
N − 1
0
)
(1) +
(
N − 1
1
)
(|〈ξ|χ〉|2)
)
=
1
N
(1 + (N − 1)λ2), (8b)
which we denote qN,λ. Thus, we only care whether the
measurement outcome is “0” or not: in case it is “0”, we
guess that |ξ〉 = |χ〉 (but we might be wrong); otherwise,
we know that 〈ξ|χ〉 = λ < 1. With this strategy, we can
only make an error when 〈ξ|χ〉 = λ < 1, in which case
the error probability is qN,λ.
Thus, to perform a forward search attack by symmetry-
test, Eve applies the above procedure (and decision strat-
egy), with
|ξ〉 ≡ |Φk,b〉, (9)
|χ〉 ≡ |Φk,0〉, (10)
and the maximum possible N . For a (non-classical)
quantum-public-key bit-encryption scheme, Eve can use
N = T , thus obtaining one-sided error qT,λ [16]. Al-
though we only suspect that this forward search attack is
nearly the optimal one, we note that the same symmetry-
test procedure is nearly optimal for the “(N ′, N ′)-copy
state distinguishing problem”, where one is given N ′
copies each of |ξ〉 and |χ〉 (and the procedure permutes
2N ′, instead of N , target registers) [12]. In the remain-
der of this work, we show that our assumption that Eve’s
probability of correctly guessing the plaintext (by for-
ward search attack) is bounded away from 1 leads to a
simple randomized encryption scheme that uses the orig-
inal deterministic scheme as a black box and is resistant
to our forward search attack.
IV. RANDOMIZATION AGAINST FORWARD
SEARCH ATTACK
Any deterministic public-key bit-encryption scheme,
quantum or classical, is susceptible to a forward search
attack. However, if the scheme can be nontrivially ex-
tended to encrypting multiple-bit plaintexts — by which
we mean that the multiple-bit scheme is not merely
the concatenation of instances of the original single-bit
scheme — one possible way to guard against a forward
search attack is to use the following parity encoding. If
the desired plaintext is b ∈ {0, 1}, Bob should first choose
a uniformly random, binary-string codeword w, whose
length is s > 1 and whose (Hamming) weight (sum of
the bits) has parity b, and then encrypt b by using the s-
bit version of the deterministic scheme to encrypt w, i.e.,
the new ciphertext encoding b is actually the ciphertext
encoding w. Assuming Alice knows that the intended
plaintext b is actually the parity of the weight of w, then
this forms a randomized bit-encryption scheme that, for
sufficiently large s, may not be susceptible to the forward
search attack (of course, we do not claim that the use
of the parity encoding results in a secure bit-encryption
scheme, in general). The parameter s thus functions as
a “security parameter”.
Now consider the case where the original determin-
istic bit-encryption scheme has no nontrivial extension
to multiple-bit plaintexts. Can it be used several times
(under different key-values) as a black box, in order to
create a randomized scheme that is potentially secure
against a compound forward search attack, whereby Eve
does a forward search attack on every instance of the
original scheme? In the classical setting, the answer is
clearly “no”: Eve would learn the correct plaintext in ev-
ery instance of the original scheme, so Alice would have
no advantage over her. In our quantum setting, how-
ever, the answer to this question is “yes”, as shown by
4the following randomized bit-encryption scheme, which
just combines the above parity encoding with the trivial
multiple-bit extension of the original scheme. Assume
that Alice’s public key is now ⊗si=1 |Ψki〉, where each ki
is uniformly randomly chosen from {0, 1}n. To encrypt
plaintext b ∈ {0, 1}, Bob again first chooses a uniformly
random codeword w, whose length is s > 1 and whose
weight has parity b. The ciphertext that encodes b is
now simply ⊗si=1 |Φki,wi〉, where w = w1w2 · · ·ws. Alice
decrypts to get w, and thus the intended plaintext b as
the parity of the weight of w.
Consider Eve’s compound forward search attack by
symmetry-test on this new scheme, whereby Eve does
s separate forward search attacks by symmetry-test as
described in the previous section, one for each value of i.
We now assume that distinct ciphertexts (under the same
key-value) in the original bit-encryption scheme are or-
thogonal, i.e., λ ≡ 〈Φki,0|Φki,1〉 = 0 for all i (this restricts
to schemes where decryption is perfect). Assuming Eve
uses |χ〉 = |Φki,0〉 for all i, she can only fail in guess-
ing wi correctly when wi = 1. Each codeword w has a
weight α of well defined parity. Thus, a codeword will be
decrypted correctly if, for some even γ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , α}, γ
out of α symmetry-tests give measurement outcome “0”
and (α−γ) symmetry-tests give a different outcome. On
average, the probabilities for Eve to decrypt successfully
each of the bit values are
P (s)(success|b = 0) = 1
2s−1
s∑
α=0
even
α∑
γ=0
even
(
s
α
)(
α
γ
)
qγ(1− q)α−γ , (11)
P (s)(success|b = 1) = 1
2s−1
s∑
α=1
odd
α∑
γ=0
even
(
s
α
)(
α
γ
)
qγ(1− q)α−γ , (12)
where q ≡ qT,0. Since we assume both plaintexts are
equally probable, we have
P (s)(success)
=
1
2
[
P (s)(success|b = 0) + P (s)(success|b = 1)
]
=
1
2
+
(1− q)s
2
(13)
=
1
2
+
(T − 1)s
2T s
, (14)
where the second-last line follows by mathematical in-
duction on s [17].
Assume now that Alice and Bob have agreed in ad-
vance on a security threshold ǫ ≪ 1, such that Eve’s
probability of success is restricted to slightly above ran-
dom guessing, i.e., P (s)(success) ≤ 1/2 + ǫ. This imme-
diately implies that the plaintext b has to be encoded
on
s ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
1 + log2(ǫ)
log2
(
T−1
T
)
∣∣∣∣∣ (15)
qubits. Working on the right-hand side of this inequal-
ity, we may derive a less tight, but simpler lower bound,
namely
s ≥ T |1 + log2(ǫ)|. (16)
Assuming our forward search attack is the optimal one,
this condition is sufficient to thwart Eve’s compound
forward search attack on the randomized bit-encryption
scheme.
V. SUMMARY
We have introduced the forward search attack in
the framework of quantum-public-key encryption, which
aims at recovering the plaintext from the ciphertext with-
out reference to the structure of the particular encryp-
tion scheme. As in the classical public-key setting, any
deterministic encryption scheme that uses quantum pub-
lic keys is susceptible to such an attack, unless some sort
of randomization is used.
Several quantum-public-key encryption schemes have
been proposed, the three most notable ones appearing in
Refs. [5, 6, 9]. The schemes in Refs. [5, 6] are random-
ized, with nontrivial extensions to multiple-bit plaintexts,
and thus they are not vulnerable to a forward search
attack [18]. The scheme in Ref. [9] is randomized in
the way we have presented in Sec. IV; our work places
that scheme in the wider cryptographic context. In terms
of computational efficiency, we note that the schemes in
Refs. [5, 6] require scalable quantum computing in order
to be secure against our forward search attack, whereas
the scheme in Ref. [9] requires only single-qubit rotations
about a fixed axis.
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Daniel Gottesman for helpful
discussions. L. M. Ioannou acknowledges support from
the EPSRC and SCALA. G. M. Nikolopoulos acknowl-
edges partial support from the EC RTN EMALI (con-
5tract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035369).
[1] D. Gottesman and I. L. Chuang, e-print
arXiv:quant-ph/0105032.
[2] H. Barnum, C. Cre´peau, D. Gottesman, A. Smith, and
A. Tapp, in Proceedings of the 43rd Annual IEEE Sympo-
sium on the Foundations of Computer Science — FOCS
’02, (IEEE Computer Society Press, Washington, DC,
2002) pp. 449-458.
[3] E. Andersson, M. Curty, and I. Jex, Phys. Rev. A 74,
022304 (2006).
[4] L. M. Ioannou and M. Mosca, e-print arXiv:0810.2780.
[5] D. Gottesman, Quantum public key cryptogra-
phy with information-theoretic security, Work-
shop on classical and quantum information
security, Caltech, 15 - 18 December (2005),
http://www.cpi.caltech.edu/quantum-security/program.html.
See also http://www.perimeterinstitute.ca/personal/dgottesman/Public-key.ppt.
[6] A. Kawachi, T. Koshiba, H. Nishimura, and T. Ya-
makami, in Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2005,
Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. Vol. 3494 (Springer, 2005), pp.
268-284. See also arXiv:quant-ph/0403069.
[7] M. Hayashi, A. Kawachi, and H. Kobayashi, Quantum
Inf. Comput. 8, 0345 (2008).
[8] S. Kak, Found. Phys. Lett. 19, 293 (2006).
[9] G. M. Nikolopoulos, Phys. Rev. A 77, 032348 (2008); 78,
019903 (2008).
[10] O. Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2004), Vol. 2.
[11] A. S. Holevo, in Proceedings of the Second Japan-
USSR Symposium on Probability Theory, edited by G.
Maruyama and J. V. Prokhorov, Lect. Notes Math. Vol.
330 (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1973), pp. 104-119.
[12] H. Buhrman, R. Cleve, J. Watrous, and R. de Wolf, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 87, 167902 (2001).
[13] C. A. Fuchs, PhD Thesis, University of New Mexico,
1995. See also e-print arXiv:quant-ph/9601020.
[14] C. W. Helstrom, Quantum Detection and Estimation
Theory, Mathematics in Science and Engineering (Aca-
demic Press, New York, 1976), Vol. 123.
[15] For this to be true, the only assumption needed is that
the set of ciphertexts of any such scheme is a subset of
the computational basis, so that the outcome of a joint
measurement with respect to the computational basis of
the actual ciphertext and one copy of the test-ciphertext
determines with certainty whether the two ciphertexts
are identical.
[16] For a classical, computationally-secure scheme imple-
mented quantum-mechanically, Eve can use arbitrarily
large N so that her error is arbitrarily close to zero, as
we would expect.
[17] The proof consists of two steps. First, it can be shown
that Eq. (13) holds for s = 1, i.e., P (1)(success) = [1 +
(1−q)]/2. Second, assuming that Eq. (13) holds for s, one
can show that it also holds for s+1. In this last step, one
needs basic identities of binomial coefficients, includingPn
j=0
`
s
j
´
= 2n and Pascal’s rule
`
n
j
´
+
`
n
j+1
´
=
`
n+1
j+1
´
.
[18] The mere fact that a (qu)bit-encryption scheme is ran-
domized is not necessarily enough for our forward search
attack to be ineffective: if the amount of randomness is
dependent on (i.e. limited by) the size of the plaintext,
then the s-(qu)bit extension of the scheme may have to
be used in order to get a secure bit-encryption scheme
(even though the single-qubit-encryption scheme may be
secure for uniformly random qubit-plaintext with respect
to the Haar measure), by encoding the intended plaintext
b ∈ {0, 1} as the ciphertext that encodes the multi-qubit
plaintext |b〉⊗s, for some s > 1.
